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 Reaktor Daya Eksperimental (RDE) is an experimental power reactor 
based on HTGR technology that implements inherent safety system. Its 
safety systems are in compliance with “defense in depth” philosophy. 
RDE is also equipped with reactor cavity cooling system (RCCS) used 
to remove the heat transferred from the reactor vessel to the containment 
structure. The RCCS is designed to fulfil this role by maintain the 
reactor vessel under the maximum allowable temperature during normal 
operation and protecting the containment structure in the event of failure 
of all passive cooling systems. The performance and reliability of the 
RCCS, therefore, are considered as critical factors in determining 
maximum design power level related to heat removal. RCCS for RDE 
will use a novel shape to efficiently remove the heat released from the 
RPV through thermal radiation and natural convection. This paper 
discusses the calculation of RCCS thermal analysis during accident. The 
RPV temperature must be maintained below 65ºC. The accident is 
assumed that there is no electricity from diesel generator supplied to the 
blower. The methodology used is based on the calculation of 
mathematical model of the RCCS in the passive mode. The heat is 
released through cavity by natural convection, in which the RCCS is 
capable to withdraw the heat at the rate of 50.54 kW per hour. 
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INTRODUCTION∗ 
Reaktor Daya Eksperimental (RDE) is a 10 
MWth nuclear power reactor design based on 
HTGR technology [1, 2]. RDE implements passive 
safety systems. Its safety system is in compliance 
with “defense in depth” philosophy, which 
includes several stages of implementation i.e. to 
prevent failure and abnormal operation, control of 
abnormal operation and detection of failures, 
control of accidents within the design limitations, 
control of severe accident conditions of 
installation, including the prevention of the 
expansion of the incident and mitigating the 
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consequences, and the mitigation of radiological 
consequences of significant release of radioactive 
material [3, 4]. Defense in depth philosophy of 
RDE has been applied starting from the multiple 
barriers in spherical fuel. The 0.5 mm radius UO2 
(uranium dioxide) kernels are coated with TRISO 
layers. The coatings mitigate and minimize the risk 
of the fission products release into the environment 
during accidents [5].  
As mentioned earlier, the reactor safety systems 
is implementing defense in depth philosophy, 
supported by passive safety systems [8]. The latter 
implies that, even without human intervention, the 
safety system will perform correctly anyway. The 
multiple barriers act as a double barrier. In an 
emergency situation, the reactor will trip due the 
coolant temperature exceeding the limit or 
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excessive reactivity occurs. In short, passive safety 
system is basically using the physics of gravity, 
mass density difference, air pressure difference, 
and others physics laws instead of engineered 
system. During passive safety system works, it is 
assumed that there is no electricity supply from 
diesel generator as backup power. Passive safety 
system is a safety system which does not require 
any action from the operator, as well as safety 
systems work automatically perform rescue action, 
although accidents as severe as any [9]. 
A Reactor Cavity Cooling System (RCCS) is 
equipped in RDE, functions as heat removal 
system. Heat transferred from the reactor vessel is 
removed to the environment so that the reactor 
wall does not overheat. The RCCS is installed in 
the cavity between the reactor vessel and the 
concrete structure. It is designed to maintain the 
reactor vessel under the maximum allowable 
temperature during normal operation and 
protecting the reactor concrete in the event of 
passive cooling systems [5]. RCCS performance 
and reliability are thus considered as critical 
factors in determining the maximum level of 
design power associated with heat removal. This 
paper evaluates and discusses RCCS capabilities in 
the event of a failure or unavailability of the 
cooling system. The maximum heat taken from the 
reactor vessel by the RCCS is estimated by using 
the calculation of RCCS heat transfer capability in 
passive mode. 
 
THEORY  
The RDE Inherent Safety 
 RDE is an inherently safe nuclear reactor, 
meaning that the reactor does not need any active 
safety intervention in the event of a depressurized 
loss of forced coolant (DLOFC) and pressurized 
loss of force coolant (PLOFC) [8, 9]. The reactor 
system automatically reverts back to a normal state 
after the shut-down transient. The goals of safety 
design in RDE are as follows. 
HTGR is the base of RDE reactor. This reactor 
will experience an automatic shutdown if an 
accident were to happen. The spherical fuel with 
multi-layer system will reduce environmental 
release of fission products. This can be virtually 
guaranteed as long as the maximum fuel 
temperature remains below 1600°C. The main 
safety system feature of RDE is inherent safety. It 
relies on negative temperature coefficient of 
reactivity, in which during the reactor temperature 
increases, the power decreases so that the 
temperature does not exceed 1600°C. The fuel 
kernel is coated by 4 TRISO layers, namely porous 
carbon buffer (95 µm of diameter), inner pyrolytic 
carbon (40 µm of diameter), silicon carbide barrier 
(35 µm of diameter) and outer pyrolytic carbon (40 
µm of diameter). The porous carbon coating 
accommodates gaseous fission product from the 
kernel [5]. Meanwhile, the other layers function to 
prevent the release of fission products. Such 
construction is considerably effective to contain the 
fission product from leaking into the coolant. 
Graphite pebble has melting point of about 2500°C, 
so that in case of fuel failure in which the 
temperature increase above 1500°C, it will not 
affect or damage the fuel integrity. In conclusion, 
there shall be no need for moving components to 
ensure that the safety targets are achieved.  
The second goal is achieved by using a passive 
cooling system, one of them being RCCS. RDE has 
itself equipped with RCCS to remove the heat 
transferred from the reactor vessel to environment 
so that the reactor wall does not overheat. RCCS is 
a radiation shield made of steel pipes placed 
between RPV and concrete walls that serve to 
absorb heat radiation. The concrete surrounding the 
reactor functions as insulation. It is designed to 
remove the heat radiated by RPV through natural 
circulation so that the concrete does not receive 
excessive heat. The objective of most RCCS 
designs is to serve as an ultimate heat sink, 
ensuring the thermal integrity of the fuel, core, 
vessel, and critical equipment within the reactor 
cavity. During normal operation, the temperature 
achieved in the fuel surface is around 1000°C. In 
the accident of DLOFC, the fuel temperature rise 
up to approximately 1500°C [11], and will decrease 
again as the RCCS removes the heat. The reactor 
cavity passively transfers the heat from the RPV to 
the surrounding environment through radiation and 
conduction. 
 
The PLOFC Accident in HTGR 
Pressurized Loss of Force Coolant 
(PLOFC) is an event where the primary system 
helium flow stops while primary system remains 
pressurized [10]. The primary helium flow is 
automatically stopped upon reactor shutdown 
followed by post-shutdown cooling system 
operating to remove the decay heat. Two safety-
related aspects of PLOFC are core heat up transient 
with the potential for delayed radioactivity release 
from the fuel, and the heat up of metallic structures 
and equipment, particularly in the upper plenum 
(e.g., control rod drives) and other components 
within primary system pressure boundaries and 
critical components. Since the primary system is 
still under pressure, natural circulation of helium 
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within the core helps equalize the core 
temperatures with the maximum core temperature 
shifting into the top of the core. Helium 
recirculation consist of upflow in the center 
(hotter) region the fuelled areas and downflow in 
the cooler core area. However, it is more 
pronounced in the cooler reflector. The maximum 
fuel temperatures in the PLOFC events are 
typically well below prescribed accident limits 
[13].  
 
D-LOFC Accident in HTGR  
In certain cases, “leak-before-break” 
assumptions are allowed by regulatory authorities 
for limiting the magnitudes of large-pipe or vessel 
rupture scenarios that need to be considered. The 
major consequence of a D-LOFC is the long-term 
core heat up and potential radioactivity release into 
the confinement, and eventually, to the 
environment (filtered and/or unfiltered) [14]. 
Unlike the P-LOFC, heat transfer due to natural 
helium circulation within the core is negligible. In 
general, the reactor is designed so that the 
maximum fuel temperature in a D-LOFC should 
not exceed the point where any significant fuel 
failure is expected. Typically, the reactor design 
(rated) power level is selected based on this 
calculation of best-estimate maximum fuel 
temperature in a D-LOFC accident. The heat up of 
metallic structures and potential material damage 
within and outside the primary system also needs 
to be evaluated. During a depressurization, some of 
the primary circulating activity, including 
radioactive graphite dust, may be released along 
with the helium. Depending on the confinement 
design and break size, a large prompt helium 
release may go unfiltered. During the core heat up 
process, certain amount of fuel failures may occur 
although, by design, any heat up phenomenon 
should result in only minor releases. Piping breaks 
and depressurization that follows would cause 
pressure distribution transients within the reactor, 
which may be very dynamic for large breaks. 
Pressure redistributions and vibrations are need to 
be evaluated to ensure the structural stability of the 
reactor internals as would possible external 
damage in the reactor confinement building and to 
the RCCS in particular. The potential for RCCS 
failure may be greater in D-LOFC events. Failure 
modes need to be evaluated since long-term loss of 
the RCCS cooling function could lead to major 
RPV and cavity damage, and thus lead to a 
dependence on other less predictable ultimate heat 
sinks [15]. 
 
 
Reactor Cavity Cooling System of RDE 
The special feature of modular HTR designs 
is a possibility of removing the decay heat from the 
reactor pressure vessel (RPV) surface without 
exceeding the permissible fuel temperature and 
RPV temperature. In addition, there is a heat sink 
via the supports and attachments of the reactor and 
steam generator vessel unit and via the fuel 
discharge nozzle. The heat is transferred from the 
RPV to the RCCS surface cooler that is placed in 
the empty space of the reactor cavity. The RCCS 
performs the following functions:  
• During normal operation and in the course of 
the cooldown by the main heat removal loop 
via the SG and steam-water circuit, the RCCS 
removes heat from the RPV surface, supports of 
the vessel unit and from the fuel discharge 
nozzle, and limits the temperature of the reactor 
cavity concrete.  
• If it is impossible to accomplish the cooldown 
via the main heat removal loop, the RCCS 
removes the reactor decay heat and maintains 
the temperature of the fuel, RPV, reactor cavity 
concrete within the permissible limits.  
 
The RCCS consists of three independent heat 
removal trains [12]. One operating train alone is 
sufficient to cool down the reactor. Two other 
RCCS trains incorporate surface cooler, headers 
that connect surface cooler tubes into sections, 
torus headers that join sections of one train, 
connecting pipelines, evaporator heat exchanger 
that consists of a water tank and a heat exchanger, 
and primary measurement transducers.  
The coolant moves in two RCCS trains by 
natural circulation. Its coolant is distilled water. 
The configuration of the third RCCS train is 
analogous to the two above ones except it lacks of 
evaporator heat exchanger. The headers of this 
RCCS train are connected to the reactor plant 
equipment cooling system. The coolant flows 
within it by forced circulation that is ensured by 
pumps of the reactor plant equipment cooling 
system. Likewise, the coolant of the reactor plant 
equipment cooling system is also distilled water. 
The RCCS schematic diagram is shown in 
Figure 1. The surface cooler of each of the two 
RCCS trains consists of separate sections. Each 
section is made of vertical U-tubes. The tubes of 
each section are joined together at their upper 
portions by two section headers (one supplies, and 
the other one removes the cooling water circulating 
inside the tubes). On the water side, the U-tubes 
are alternately connected to respective sections of 
different RCCS trains. Every third tube in the tube 
bundle is connected to one inlet header and one 
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outlet header, respectively. Thus, with one or two 
RCCS trains failed, the heat removal will be 
guaranteed for the entire perimeter of the surface 
cooler. 
The height of the surface cooler sections is 
equal to the height of the reactor cavity. Each tube 
in the section has a bend in its lower portion to 
compensate for temperature-induced 
displacements. The tube segments that receive the 
water cooled in the evaporator heat exchanger are 
placed closer to the reactor cavity wall surface. 
The surface cooler tubes are attached to a shield 
made of sheet steel. This shield between the 
surface cooler and the reactor cavity concrete 
reduces the reactor cavity concrete heat up 
produced by thermal radiation from the RPV. The 
gap between the surface cooler and the concrete is 
sealed such that air streams do not enter the gap. 
The surface cooler sections are evenly distributed 
around the RPV and attached to the vertical wall of 
the reactor cavity. The fastening elements of the 
sections allow temperature-induced downward 
displacements of the sections. The RCCS 
conceptual design of RDE is shown in Figure 1. 
Detail parameters of the reactor cavity and water 
cooled panel, like shown in Table 1. 
 
Fig 1. The RCCS conceptual design of RDE 
 
 
Table 1. Detail parameters of the reactor cavity and 
water cooled panel 
Parameter Dimension (m) 
Height of reactor cavity 12.8 
Diameter of reactor cavity 6 
Diameter of reactor pressure 
vessel 
4.36 
Diameter of water cooled panel 5.9 
Height of water cooled panel 9.5 
Thickness of steel sheet 0.005 
Outer diameter of water cooled 
pipe 
0.032 
Inner diameter of water cooled 
pipe 
0.026 
Pitch of water cooled pipe 0.13 
 
 
METHODOLOGY 
This paper discusses the calculation of RCCS 
thermal analysis during the station blackout (SBO) 
accident. All of active cooling systems were 
assumed to be failed when SBO occurred and the 
heat removal is conducted by RCCS. The SBO is 
assumed that there is no electricity from diesel 
generator supplied to the blower. The methodology 
used is based on the calculation of heat transfer 
capability of the RCCS in the passive mode. The 
active one is the piping system of circulated water 
around RPV to discharge the heat through cooling 
tower. The passive mode works during the failure 
of active mode, and the heat is release through 
cavity by natural convection. 
 
Experimental facility description 
As shown in Figure 1, the number of RCCS 
loop is two loops, with 50 heating pipe on each 
loop as standpipes. All components were enclosed 
with high temperature materials. The concrete 
behind the vessel was made of an insulating 
material to limit heat losses. The operational 
thermal parameter of RCCS, like shown in Table 2. 
 
Table 2. The operational thermal parameter of RCCS 
Parameter Data 
Number of RCCS Loop 2 loop 
Number of heating pipe per loop 50 pipes 
Height of Heating Area, H1 (D-E) 9.5 m 
Diameter of cooled pipe 2 inch 
Flowrate in cooled pipe 0.16575 
kg/sec 
Reactor Cavity Radius (D-B) 3 m 
Reactor Cavity Height 12.5 m 
Reactor Cavity Concrete Thickness 1 m 
Center Reactor to Cooled Pipe Center 
(D-A) 
4.1 m 
Height E-A 2 m 
Height D-A 12.5 m 
Pipe lenght upstream heating area 16.6 m 
Pipe lenght downstream heating area 6.1 m 
Flow rate of heating pipe inlet 0.03315 
kg/sec 
Water temp. upsteam of heating area 312 K 
Water density in upstream of heating 
area 
990.07 kg/m3 
Water temp. Downsteam of heating 
area 
319.599 K 
Water density in Downstream of 
heating area 
985.0863 
kg/m3 
 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The RCCS is designed as the ultimate heat 
sink. It ensures that the thermal integrity of the 
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nuclear fuel, the core, the Reactor Pressure Vessel 
(RPV), and all equipment in the reactor cavity is 
achieved. At normal operation, the RCCS ensure 
that the concrete structure surrounding the RPV is 
kept below 65°C and below 125ºC in case of total 
loss of the primary helium coolant accident. The 
more detailed conceptual design of RCCS is shown 
in Figure 1. 
The heat from the RPV then discharged to the 
environment through the cooling tower. The 
passive system flows by natural convection as a 
result of the difference between hot and cold water 
temperature. Passive cooling systems have many 
advantages over normal cooling systems. By using 
a passive system, the design, installation, 
operation, and maintenance of the cooling system 
is simplified compared to a normal cooling water 
pumping system. The number of components of a 
passive cooling system is considerably less than 
that of a normal cooling system. The total of 80% 
reduction in pipe usage is possible if a passive 
cooling system is used [7,8]. This makes a passive 
cooling system both very economically as well as 
functionally competitive. The fact that a passive 
cooling system uses no mechanical components 
makes the system very reliable. The reactor can 
thus be regarded as inherently safe, because if the 
system has a very high reliability, the chance of a 
breakdown is very small. Thus, there is a very 
small possibility that the reactor failed to be 
maintained well within the specified allowed 
temperatures. 
The RCCS is designed with stand pipes and 
installed surrounding the RPV. The water is used 
as cooling system. The RCCS has passive 
operations mode as stated. The water from the 
storage tank circulated to the stand pipes and 
removed the heat    from the vessel. Water pumped 
back to the storage tanks and the heat released to 
the environment via cooling tower. If SBO 
occurred, the RPV cooling is conducted by the 
cavity between RPV and concrete. The air 
removed the heat from RPV by natural convection 
and still capable to maintain temperature below its 
design limit. The cavity connected to the 
atmosphere directly and the heat can be released. 
The fuel temperature will decrease until 800°C 
within 20 days. 
We will calculate heat loss during the station 
blackout condition, using the following equations:  
Head Loss due to friction along pipe: 
 
  hf = f !! !!!"  (1) 
 
 
Pressure Drop:  
 ∆! = ! !! !"!!   (2) 
 ! =  !!!" + !∞ (1+  !!!!!.!)  (3) 
 
Heat Loss : 
 h! = K !!!"  (4) 
where: 
hf = Minor losses 
f = Darcy friction factor 
L = Length of pipe  
v = flowrate velocity 
D = diameter of pipe 
g = gravitational acceleration ! = density 
K = resistance coefficient 
Re = Reynolds number 
Dn = Dynamic viscocity  
Kd = coefficient of friction 
hL = Heat Loss 
From the mathematical calculation, the following are 
the results of the heat loss, it’s show in Table 3. But 
the comparation of heat loss transfer for normal and 
accident condition, like on Table 4.  
 
Table 3. The convection heat transfer from RPV 
 
Parameter Value Unit 
Gas absolute viscosity 2.45E-05 kg/m/s 
Air density 1.293 kg/m3 
Gas kinematic viscosity 2.99E-05 m2/s 
Air thermal expansion coeff 2.32E-03 1/K 
Air thermal conductifity 0.00358  W/mK 
Gr (grashof number) 4.74E+09  
Q-conv RPV 50542.758 W 
Total Heat Loss Transfer from 
RPV 
5.054E+04 W 
 
Table 4. the Mathematical calculation of heat loss 
ttransfer on normal and accident condition. 
 
Parameter Normal Accident Unit 
T-RPV [K] 507 673 K 
T-RCCS [K] 353 373 K 
Q from RPV [kW] 22.70588 50.54276 kW 
T-inlet heating pipe [K] 312 312 K 
T-outlet heating pipe 
[K] 313.1194 314.4917 K 
Pressure Gain [kg.m-1.s-
2)] (no cooler, = max. 
Cooler pressure drop to 
allow natural circulation 
in the RCCS loop) 
1138.179 2535.45 kg.m
-
1.s-2) 
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 During station blackout, the total heat transfer 
from RPV is 50.54 kW. This phenomenon can be 
illustrated graphically as shown in Figure 2.  
 
 
Fig 2. Diagram of temperature rise of water along 
RCCS pipe 
 
 From the figure, it can be explained that the 
temperature is proportional to the pipe height. The 
more pipe height, the higher the temperature. 
Effect of water density on pipe length is shown in 
Figure 3. 
 
 
 
Fig 3. Density of water along RCCS pipe 
 
 From the figure, it is shown that the pipe 
height is inversely proportional to the water 
density. Meanwhile, the effect of mass flow of 
water along RCCS pipe is shown in Figure 4. 
 
 
Fig 4.  Diagram mass flow of water along 
RCCS pipe 
 
It is understood that despite the pipe height 
increase, mass flow of water tends to remain 
constant. Referring to the Fukushima Daiichi 
accident, where tsunami caused station blackout, it 
is assumed here that all of electrical supply from 
outside plant is unavailable, the primary coolant 
blower fails, and the RCCS active mode also fails. 
Decay heat is removed by passive cavity cooling. 
RCCS eliminates the remaining decay heat through 
natural circulation. The heat is transferred by 
conduction to the pressure vessel and then 
radiation from the pressure vessel to RCCS via 
natural circulation. This mechanism is adequate to 
keep the core temperatures below the maximum 
design limit. The fuel maximum temperature 
allowable is 1600°C, while the highest normal 
operating fuel temperature should not be greater 
than 1250ºC. Fuel failure rates are extremely low 
below these temperatures and increases rapidly at 
much higher temperatures [16]. 
The heat from RPV is transferred to the 
environment by natural circulation. The SBO did 
no harm to the RDE because the RCCS are 
successful in maintaining the integrity of the fuel 
temperature beyond its design limit. The RCCS 
absorbs the heat from the reactor vessel directly by 
radiation and indirectly from the guard 
containment to atmosphere by natural convection. 
 
CONCLUSION 
RDE has an RCCS that serves to remove the 
heat transferred by the reactor vessel to the 
environment so that the containment structure does 
not receive excessive heat. The RCCS is designed 
to keep the reactor vessel below the maximum 
allowable temperature during normal operation and 
protect the reactor isolation structure. During SBO, 
all cooling systems are failed and heat removal is 
R.	Kusumastuti	et	al.	/	Tri	Dasa	Mega	Vol.	21	No.	2	(2019)	87–93 
 
93 
performed by RCCS. At such condition, the total 
heat transfer from RPV is 50.54 kW. 
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